91-1984

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
JUN 4 1992
OFFICE OF THE CLERK

NO. _____

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1992

SOUTH CAROLINA PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION,

Petitioner,

v.

SHERMAN J. OLIVIER,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX OF PETITIONER

GREGORY C. BUFFALOW
Counsel of Record for South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association
P. O. Box 1988
Mobile, Alabama 36633
(205) 432-7682

OF COUNSEL:

JOHNSTONE, ADAMS, BAILEY, GORDON & HARRIS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions Below

A. Olivier v. Merritt Dredging Co., Inc. 954 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1992) 1

B. Olivier v. Merritt Dredging Co., Inc., No. 84-0890-B (S.D. Ala. Dec. 21, 1990)(order granting motion to dismiss)..... 43

Constitutional Provisions Involved

C. Art. IV, Sec. 1 54

D. Amend. X 54

E. Amend XIV, Sec. 1 54

Statutory Provisions Involved

F. Ala.R.Civ.P. Rule 4.2(a) 55

G. Ala. Code § 6-6-390 (1975) 58

H. S.C. Code Ann. § 38-31-20(3) (1988)... 59

I. S.C. Code Ann. § 38-31-30 (1988)..... 59

J. S.C. Code Ann. § 38-31-40 (1988)..... 60

K. S.C. Code Ann. § 38-31-60(a) 60 (1988)

L. S.C. Code Ann. § 38-31-60(b) (1988)... 61

M. S.C. Code Ann. § 38-31-60(c) 61
(1988)

N. S.C. Code Ann. § 38-31-100(2) (1988).. 64

Certificate of Service 65

APPENDIX A

Sherman J. OLIVIER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MERRITT DREDGING COMPANY, INC., South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association, Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association, Defendants-Appellees

No. 91-7078.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

March 6, 1992.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.

Before JOHNSON*, CLARK*, and PECK**, Senior Circuit Judges.

JOHN W. PECK, Senior, Senior Circuit Judge:

Sherman J. Olivier, a resident of Louisiana and a seaman injured aboard a vessel in Alabama, appeals the dismissal of writs of

---

[Footnotes at page 38 et seq.]

garnishment issued to the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association [LIGA] and the South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association [SCIGA]. The district court in Alabama dismissed the writs on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the garnishees. The court held that LIGA and SCIGA did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Alabama in order to be subject to personal jurisdiction within the state. Because we find that SCIGA and LIGA had sufficient minimum contacts with Alabama and we believe that judicial economy would best be served by keeping this litigation within that forum, we reverse the district court's order.

I. FACTS

On August 1, 1983 Sherman J. Olivier sustained personal injuries while employed by the Merritt Dredging Company [Merritt] as a

sailor aboard a vessel in Alabama on the Alabama River. At the time of his injuries, Olivier was a resident of Louisiana. Merritt was a South Carolina corporation with its principal place of business in South Carolina.

On March 30, 1984 Merritt filed for bankruptcy in South Carolina. In order to protect the bankruptcy estate, the bankruptcy court temporarily stayed the personal injury suit Olivier had brought against Merritt in Alabama. The bankruptcy court lifted its stay on September 26, 1985.

To provide insurance for its various operations including its activity in Alabama, Merritt contracted with the Midland Insurance Company [Midland]. Like Merritt, Midland faced financial difficulties. On April 3, 1986 Midland, a New York corporation, was liquidated pursuant to an order of the Supreme Court of New York. The liquidation proceedings once again stayed Olivier's personal injury suit

against Merritt.

The second stay was lifted on May 22, 1987. In December 1988 a jury in Alabama awarded Olivier $507,340.00. On February 14, 1989 Olivier received a judgment against Merritt of $522,190.00, interest from the date of the judgment, and costs.

Due to the insolvency of both Merritt and its insurer, Midland, Olivier requested that the district court in Alabama issue writs of garnishment to LIGA, SCIGA, and the Alabama Insurance Guaranty Association [AIGA]. On July 21, 1989 the district court issued the writs.

AIGA, LIGA, and SCIGA are unincorporated associations created by state statutes. *See* Ala.Code §§ 27-42-1 *et seq.* (1975), La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 22:1375 *et seq.* (West Supp.1991), S.C.Code Ann. §§ 38-31-01 *et seq.* (Law.Co-op.1976).[2] The AIGA writ is not at issue in this appeal. The guaranty

associations were established for the purpose of avoiding financial loss or excessive delay in payment to claimants or policyholders due to the insolvency of an insurer. *See* La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§22:1376, 22:1382, S.C.Code Ann. § 38-31-60; *see also Rhulen Agency, Inc. v. Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass'n*, 896 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1990). Insurance companies that underwrite risks in the state in which the guaranty association exists are required to pay assessments necessary to fund the guaranty association. *See* La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 22:1380, 22:1382, S.C.Code An. §§ 38-31-40, 38-31-60. Prior to its liquidation, Midland was subject to assessments by LIGA and SCIGA. Pursuant to LIGA's and SCIGA's motions, on December 21, 1990 the district court in Alabama dismissed the writs of garnishment it had previously issued on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the

garnishees. Olivier appeals the district court's order of December 21, 1990.

II. DISCUSSION

A. ALABAMA LONG ARM JURISDICTION

[1,2] This circuit conducts *de novo* review of a district court's dismissal of an action for lack of personal jurisdiction. *Madara v. Hall*, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir.1990). We begin our inquiry into whether the district court properly refused to assert personal jurisdiction with a two-part analysis. First, we consider whether the district court could obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant to the applicable state long-arm statute. Second, we consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

In interpreting the reach of the state's long-arm statute, the Supreme Court of Alabama has extended the jurisdiction of Alabama courts to the extent permissible under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *See Alabama Waterproofing Co., Inc. v. Hanby*, 431 So.2d 141, 145 (Ala.1983). Thus, in order to determine whether the district court in Alabama properly refused to exercise personal jurisdiction, we need only consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction would have satisfied the requirements of due process.

B. DUE PROCESS

[3] The determination of whether a district court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is itself a two-part inquiry. In the first prong of our due process inquiry, we consider whether the defendants, LIGA and SCIGA, engaged in

minimum contacts with the State of Alabama. In the second prong of our inquiry, we consider whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants would offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." *Madara*, 916 F.2d at 1516 (quoting *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)).

1. Minimum Contacts

In analyzing the parties' arguments we are guided by the language of several recent Supreme Court opinions. As the Supreme Court has stated:

> [M]inimum-contacts analysis presupposes that two or more States may be interested in the outcome of a dispute, and the process of resolving potentially conflicting "fundamental substantive social policies" can usually be accommodated through choice-of-law rules rather than through outright preclusions of jurisdiction in one forum. (citations omitted) *Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz*, 471 U.S. 462, 483 n. 26, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2188 n. 26, 85 L.Ed.22d 528 (1985).

In 1989 Olivier, a resident of Louisiana, received a judgment in Alabama (the place where he sustained his injuries) against Merritt, a South Carolina corporation. Olivier contends that the judgment entitled him to proceed against Merritt's bankrupt insurer, Midland. Olivier maintains that his claim is a "covered claim" within the meaning of the Louisiana and South Carolina statutes governing the respective state insurance guaranty associations; Midland is an insolvent insurer and the claimant or insured was a resident of either Louisiana or South Carolina at the time of the insured event. *See* La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 22:1379(3)(a)[3], S.C.Code Ann. § 38-31-20(6)[4].

Furthermore, Olivier argues that since his claim is a "covered claim", according to the respective statutes LIGA and SCIGA are deemed insurers to the extent of Midland's obligations. *See* La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 22:1382

A(1) and (2)[5], S.C.Code Ann. §§ 38-31-60(a) and (b)[6].

Olivier contends that Midland is subject to personal jurisdiction in Alabama because it provided insurance coverage for Merritt for accidents that occurred while operating its vessel in Alabama waters. By guaranteeing payment of Midland's policies that provided insurance for claimants who are state residents or insureds who are state residents, Olivier contends LIGA and SCIGA should reasonably have foreseen that they would be subject to suit in other jurisdictions. Olivier claims that the statutes, which place LIGA and SCIGA in the position of an insolvent insurer, impose affirmative, extraterritorial obligations upon them. Because Midland is subject to personal jurisdiction in Alabama, Olivier argues that both LIGA and SCIGA are subject to personal jurisdiction in Alabama as well. Olivier argues that LIGA's and SCIGA's statutory

obligations establish minimum contacts with Alabama sufficient to justify the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over them.

As mere creations of their respective state statutes, LIGA and SCIGA claim they have not purposefully directed any activity toward the State of Alabama. Neither LIGA nor SCIGA maintains any offices or agents in Alabama. The associations contend that Midland's contacts with Alabama are not at issue since personal jurisdiction is not being sought after Midland, but after LIGA and SCIGA. LIGA and SCIGA claim that they will be denied due process if they are subject to legal liability in Alabama on account of the unilateral activity of a third party---Midland.

In addition, LIGA and SCIGA argue that although it might have been foreseeable that the associations could become involved in

litigation in Alabama, such foreseeability alone is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. LIGA and SCIGA maintain that foreseeability is only one factor to be considered in an analysis of a defendant's minimum contacts with a forum.

LIGA and SCIGA note that neither of the state insurance guaranty acts specifically authorizes suit against an insurance guaranty association outside the state which created the association. The associations argue that this conspicuous absence indicates that it was not the intent of the state legislatures to permit LIGA and SCIGA to be subject to suit in other jurisdictions.

In support of their arguments, LIGA and SCIGA rely upon the reasoning of the district court in *Rhulen Agency, Inc. v. Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass'n*, 715 F.Supp. 94, 97 (S.D.N.Y.1989); *aff'd on other grounds*. 896 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.1990). We are not persuaded

by the court's reasoning in *Rhulen*. Indeed, we believe the district court decision concerning personal jurisdiction over AIGA and other state insurance guaranty associations is entitled to no weight since the Second Circuit held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; this holding precluded any consideration of the existence of personal jurisdiction over the defendants. *Rhulen*, 896 F.2d at 675-676.

For the reasons outlined below we believe Olivier has the superior argument. In the seminal case, *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a defendant be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court. *See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson*, 444 U.S. 286, 291, 100 S.Ct. 559, 564, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). Thus, we recognize that

even if the forum state is the most convenient location for litigation, the due process clause may act to divest a state's courts of the power to render a valid judgment if a defendant does not have the requisite minimum contacts with the forum. *World-Wide Volkswagen*, 444 U.S. at 294, 100 S.Ct. at 566; *Hanson v. Denckla*, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 254, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1238, 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).

[4] The Supreme Court has opined that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that defendants have "fair warning" that particular activities may subject them to the jurisdiction of foreign sovereigns. *Burger King*, 471 U.S. at 472, 105 S.Ct. at 2182. One of the considerations important in assessing whether or not a defendant has fair warning is the foreseeability of suit within the jurisdiction. The foreseeability that is critical in an analysis of minimum contacts is whether "the defendant's conduct and connection

with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." *World-Wide Volkswagen*, 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. at 567. In attempting to define when a defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court, the Supreme Court has stated " . . . there must be some act by which the defendant purposefully availed itself of conducting activities within the forum state." *Hanson*, 357 U.S. at 253, 78 S.Ct. at 1239-1240. This requirement exists to ensure that a defendant will not be subject to legal liability in a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts. *Burger King*, 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. at 2183.

[5] In the instant case, LIGA and SCIGA are subject to legal liability in Alabama neither on account of random contacts nor on account of the unilateral activity of Midland Insurance. We hold that the acts of

guaranteeing insurance obligations within the state and of assuming the role of insurer are of such a nature that they justify the legal fiction that LIGA and SCIGA have consented to service of process and suit in Alabama. *Cf. International Shoe*, 326 U.S. at 318, 66 S.Ct. at 159.

LIGA and SCIGA guaranteed payment of "covered claims". *See* La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 22:1379(3)(a), S.C.Code Ann. § 38-31-20(6). The "claimant", Olivier, was a Louisiana resident. The "insured", Merritt, was a South Carolina corporation. The insurance company, Midland, was an "insolvent insurer" authorized to transact business in Louisiana and South Carolina at the time of Olivier's accident. In Alabama, the state in which he suffered injuries, Olivier received a judgment against Merritt. Because neither Merritt nor its insurer, Midland, could meet its obligations to the appellant, Olivier proceeded against the

associations that guaranteed payment.

Not only did LIGA and SCIGA guarantee payment of "covered claims", but they also assumed all rights, duties, and obligations of the insolvent insurer as if the insurer had not become insolvent. *See* La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 22:1382 A(2), S.C.Code Ann. § 38-31-60(b). By the language of the statutes that govern LIGA and SCIGA, we find that these associations had fair warning that they could be subject to suit for "covered claims" in jurisdictions outside of their respective states.

[6] LIGA and SCIGA assessed Midland in order to have sufficient funds to guarantee "covered claims". Midland insured Merritt's operations in Alabama. By serving as guarantors of Midland's obligation to Olivier, LIGA and SCIGA purposefully availed themselves of conducting activities within Alabama. Indeed, since the Supreme Court's decision in *McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.*, 355

U.S. 220, 223, 78 S.Ct. 199, 201, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), it has been the law that when a party assumes insurance obligations in a state in which it has no other business, the party has submitted to the jurisdiction of the state's courts.

In reaching our conclusion we draw upon the holding of the Supreme Court of Alabama in *Keelean v. Central Bank of the South*, 544 So.2d 153 (Ala.1989). In *Keelean*, non-resident defendants guaranteed payment of a promissory note of a foreign corporation issued to an Alabama bank. Even though the defendants signed the guaranties outside of Alabama, the court held that the guarantors should have foreseen in the event of a default the effects of their guaranties in the State of Alabama. The court concluded that execution of the guaranties constituted sufficient minimum contacts required by the due process clause. *Keelean*, 544 So.2d at 157-158.

Moreover, other courts of appeals have reached conclusions similar to the one we reach today. In *Forsythe v. Overmyer*, 576 F.2d 779 (9th Cir.1978), *cert denied*, 439 U.S. 864, 99 S.Ct. 188, 58 L.Ed.2d. 174 (1978), the Ninth Circuit held that a non-resident third party's personal guaranty of a lease contract to be executed in California constituted minimum contact sufficient to subject the third party to the jurisdiction of California courts. *Forsythe*, 576 F.2d at 783-784. *See also National Can Corp. v. K Beverage Co.*, 674 F.2d 1134, 1137 (6th Cir.1982); *Marathon Metallic Bldg., Co. v. Mountain Empire Constr. Co.*, 653 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981).

We conclude that the associations' obligations to defend suits in other jurisdictions would not be unduly burdensome. Indeed, both LIGA and SCIGA may alleviate the cost of litigation in other jurisdictions by adjusting their insurance assessments. Or if

the expenses are too great, they have the option of altering their obligations and coverage for claims. *Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen*, 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. at 567.

2. Fair Play and Substantial Justice

[7] Once a court has decided that a defendant has established minimum contacts within a forum state, these contacts may be considered in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with "fair play and substantial justice." *Burger King*, 471 U.S. at 476, 105 S.Ct. at 2184. As the Supreme Court has stated, other factors may serve to establish the reasonableness of personal jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required. *Burger King*, 471 U.S. at 477, 105 S.Ct. at 2184. Some of these factors include: the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient

and effective relief, the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. *Id.*

In addition, as the Supreme Court of the United States has noted " . . . modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity." *McGee*, 355 U.S. at 222-223, 78 S.St. at 201. The Supreme Court subsequently stated that the historical developments noted in *McGee* have only accelerated in the generation since that case was decided. *World-Wide Volkswagen*, 444 U.S. at 293, 100 S.Ct. at 565. By guaranteeing payment of an insurance claim that arose out of an accident in Alabama and that went to judgment within the State, LIGA and SCIGA engaged in economic

activity in Alabama. Due to the effects of their economic activity within the State, requiring LIGA and SCIGA to adjudicate in Alabama is not a substantial burden.

It would be unduly burdensome, however, to require Olivier to seek coverage for his claim from LIGA in Louisiana courts and from SCIGA in South Carolina courts. Such a requirement would spread thin his resources and would hamper Olivier's ability to obtain quick, convenient, and effective relief. *See McGee*, 355 U.S. at 223, 78 S.Ct. at 201. Indeed, it would frustrate the very purposes of the state insurance guaranty associations. *See e.g.* La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 22:1376. Furthermore, a requirement that Olivier sue in both Louisiana and South Carolina would pose an unnecessary waste of precious judicial resources. Separate litigations do not necessarily insure fairness; in this case they would inhibit it.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above we REVERSE the order of the district court and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JOHNSON, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Prior to today, the particular issue in this case whether personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state insurance guaranty association is consistent with due process, had not yet been resolved by any United States Court of Appeals. As of today, the issue continued to await a correct resolution. In my opinion, the majority overrates the less-than-minimum contacts of LIGA and SCIGA to Alabama and further exacerbates this error by misconstruing the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Olivier clearly fell short of his burden of justifying the exercise of personal jurisdiction over these non-profit

creatures of foreign state legislation. *See Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau*, 495 F.2d 483, 490 (5th Cir.1974) (the burden of proving personal jurisdiction is on the plaintiff).

1. *Minimum Contacts*

The majority finds sufficient minimum contacts in two acts taken by LIGA and SCIGA: (1) "guaranteeing insurance obligations *within the state* " of Alabama (emphasis added) and (2) "assuming the role of insurer." There are three flaws in the majority's finding. My first two objections relate to the majority's characterizations of the enabling statutes. My final criticism of the majority's finding of minimum contacts relates to its analytical focus.

First, the majority's assertion that LIGA and SCIGA guarantee "insurance obligations within" Alabama constitutes an imprecise interpretation of the statutes at issue because it implies that the statutes focus, at least to

some degree, on Alabama. In order for a claim to be "covered" under the statutes, either (1) the claimant or the insured must reside in the state which established the insurance guaranty association, or (2) the property giving rise to the claim must be permanently located in the state which established the insurance guaranty association. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 22:1379(3)(a) (West Supp.1991); S.C.Code Ann. § 38-31-20(6) (Law.Co-op.1990). Consequently, although it is technically true that LIGA and SCIGA guarantee insurance obligations within Alabama, they do so only because a covered claim could rise in *any* state, as long as one connection exists between the state which created the insurance guaranty association and either the plaintiff, the insured, or the property giving rise to the claim.[1]

Second, the majority's reliance on the provisions which mandate LIGA and SCIGA's assumption of the role of the insurer exalts

form over substance. *See* La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 22:1382(A)(2) (West Supp.1991) ("The association shall [b]e deemed the insurer to the extent of its obligations on the covered claim . . . ."); S.C.Code Ann. § 38-31-60(b) (Law.Co-op.1990) ("The Association . . . is considered the insurer to the extent of its obligation on the covered claims . . . ."). These statutory provisions relate only to substantive insurance obligations; to interpret them as mandating that LIGA and SCIGA shall always be deemed or considered to be the insurer for purposes of personal jurisdiction attributes an unreasonably broad scope to these provisions.

Finally, the majority's minimum contacts analysis reflects an undue focus on foreseeability. *See ante* at 1557. Foreseeability ought not to be the sole focus of the due process analysis. Rather, this Court must also find that LIGA and SCIGA

"'purposefully directed'" their activities at Alabama. *Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz*, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2181, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). *I.e.*, LIGA and SCIGA must have "'purposely derive[d] benefit'" from their Alabama contacts, *id.* at 473, 105 S.Ct. at 2183, or "manifestly . . . availed [themselves] of the privilege of conducting business [in Alabama] shielded by 'the benefits and protections' of [Alabama] laws," *id.* at 476, 105 S.Ct. at 2184. The contacts relied on by the majority clearly fail to establish such purposeful availment by LIGA and SCIGA. Rather, those contacts are "'random, fortuitous,' [and] 'attenuated,'" *id.* at 475, 105 S.Ct. at 2183. (citations omitted), and, as such, they are insufficient to justify an exercise of personal jurisdiction.[2] Furthermore, fairly read, these provisions indicate an intent to bestow benefit upon only in-state claimants and insureds, thus negating

any inference that LIGA and SCIGA purposefully subjected themselves to the benefits of Alabama law.

The remainder of the majority's evaluation of minimum contacts further obfuscates the purposeful availment requirement. The majority asserts that, because both LIGA and SCIGA assessed dues against Midland and Midland insured a risk in Alabama, purposeful availment exists under the reasoning of *McGee v International Life Insur. Co.*, 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), involving a defendant who was a primary insurer, and four other cases involving defendants who were private guarantors. All of those cases, however, are clearly distinguishable from the one at bar. First, in all five cases, the defendant was aware that an occurrence of the insured risk or a default on the guaranteed note would have effects in the forum state. *See McGee*, 355 U.S. at 223, 78 S.Ct. at 201;

National Can Corp. v. K Beverage Co., 674 F.2d 1134, 1137 (6th Cir.1982); *Marathon Metallic Bldg. co. v. Mountain Empire Constr. Co.*, 653 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981); *Forsythe v. Overmyer*, 576 F.2d 779, 781-83 (9th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 439 U.S. 864, 99 S.Ct. 188, 58 L.Ed.2d 174 (1978); *Keelean v. Central Bank of the South*, 544 So.2d 153, 157 (Ala. 1989). In the case *sub judice*, it was merely foreseeable rather than actually foreseen that, if Midland generated a covered claim, it could arise in Alabama. Moreover, in all but one of the majority's cases, the court attributed a profit-motive to the establishment of contacts with the forum state by the defendant, a private person or entity. *See McGee*, 355 U.S. at 221-23, 78 S.Ct. at 200-01; *National Can*, 674 F.2d at 1137; *Marathon Metallic*, 653 F.2d at 923; *Forsythe*, 576 F.2d at 781-83.[3] Unlike the cases relied on by the majority, the case at

bar involves non-profit creatures of statute,[4] formed solely to aid beneficiaries of policies issued by insolvent insurers,[5] in which membership is compulsory for insurers who wish to do business in the state that created the insurance guaranty association,[6] whose funds are derived solely from premiums written in the state which created the association,[7] and whose assessments against member insurers do not reflect an evaluation of risk, but rather are simply proportional to the particular member's share of the total amount of premiums written in the state that created the association.[8] Because the insured in this case, Merritt, was a South Carolina corporation, a portion of the premiums it paid to Midland went toward funding SCIGA---*i.e.*, SCIGA received funding directly related to the insurance policy that covered the Alabama tort which gave rise to the instant action. LIGA, however, received no additional funds as a

result of the policy at issue in this case although it did benefit to the extent that Midland paid LIGA a portion of its premiums from Louisiana insureds, but those Louisiana insureds have absolutely no connection to this litigation. Neither SCIGA nor LIGA can be said to have purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of Alabama law merely by receiving money from Midland, who coincidentally insured the Alabama tort; this money in no way reflected an evaluation of the Alabama risks under the Merritt policy or an effort to profit from Midland's insurance of risks in Alabama.

Moreover, the priority provisions of the guaranty statutes (which the majority ignores) also negates a finding of purposeful availment. These provisions specify, in cases where more than one guaranty association may be liable, from which association the claimant must seek recovery first. La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 22:1386(B) (West Supp.1991); S.C.Code Ann.

§ 38-31-100(2) (Law.Coop.1990).[9] Olivier argued that these provisions clearly imply that LIGA and SCIGA anticipated being haled into foreign fora. The more likely explanation, however, posits that LIGA and SCIGA expected that the claimant would exhaust his remedy against the association that is required to be sued first in its state's forum, then pursue a remedy against the next association in its state's forum and so on. Rather than purposeful availment, the priority provisions indicate a desire on the part of LIGA and SCIGA to be sued only in their own fora.

I therefore believe that LIGA and SCIGA lack minimum contacts with Alabama.

2. *Fair Play and Substantial Justice*

Olivier would still be entitled to a reversal, notwithstanding his insufficient showing on the minimum contacts prong, if he had made an exceptionally strong showing that an exercise of personal jurisdiction over LIGA

and SCIGA would be consistent with fair play and substantial justice. *Sun Bank, N.A. v. E.F. Hutton & Co.*, 926 F.2d 1030, 1034-35 (11th Cir.1991). This he failed to do. Fair play and substantial justice connote five factors: (1) the burden on the defendant, (2) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and (5) the shared interests of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. *Burger King*, 471 U.S. at 476-77, 105 S.Ct. at 2184-85.

In the case at bar, the first and fifth factors converge and weigh heavily against the majority's holding. The majority asserts that any burden placed on the insurance guaranty associations and the social policy they serve may be alleviated by raising assessments or

reducing coverage of claims. *See ante* at 1559.[10] The majority further claims that Olivier's interest (the third factor) and the fifth factor are intertwined such that a failure to find personal jurisdiction over LIGA and SCIGA will "frustrate the very purposes of the state insurance guaranty association." *See ante* at 1559. The majority underestimates the scope and magnitude of the effect its holding will have on insurance guaranty associations. As non-profit creatures of statute designed to benefit in-state claimants and insureds, they will have to raise relatively substantial sums of money, in what may become a large number of cases, to hire attorneys in foreign jurisdictions and pay other costs of defense in foreign fora. The social goal of aiding claimants and insureds of insolvent insurers will be disserved, and perhaps even defeated, by forcing the guaranty associations to expend a large share of their

resources defending in foreign fora rather than actually satisfying covered claims.

Returning to the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the majority is unwilling to force Olivier to pursue his claims in Louisiana (his home state) and South Carolina. However, such litigation is not likely to be significantly more difficult or costly in those fora because the issues are primarily of a legal rather than a factual nature. Furthermore, unless SCIGA fails to satisfy all of Olivier's allegedly covered claim, he will have to litigate in only one forum.[11] Perhaps the majority means to adopt Olivier's argument that, unless the court below has personal jurisdiction over appellees, he could be faced with a denial of coverage by each association in its own state courts. The fatal flaw in this argument is that it assumes that the court below will decide questions of Louisiana and South Carolina law contrary to

the way the Louisiana and South Carolina courts would. Surely, Olivier cannot have a legitimate interest in a forum based on the possibility that it will decide questions of foreign law erroneously.[12] Indeed, his only legitimate interest is in the efficiency of obtaining relief *if* it is due, not in obtaining a more favorable holding on the substantive law. *Burger King*, 471 U.S. at 477, 15 S.Ct. at 2184.

Harking back to the second factor, which the majority ignores, Alabama, the forum state, possesses only a relatively minor interest in supplying the forum for this case. The underlying tort occurred and was reduced to judgment in Alabama, but all the parties to the tort action and the garnishment action (with the exception of the Alabama Insurance Guaranty Association) hail from outside Alabama.

Finally, the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient

resolution of controversies might weigh in favor of a finding of personal jurisdiction in this case because judicial resources might be saved if Olivier were not faced with the *possibility* of having to seek garnishment against AIGA, LIGA, and SCIGA in three different fora to obtain complete satisfaction of his covered claim. However, this judicial efficiency argument squarely depends on Olivier's being unable to satisfy in full his allegedly covered claim against SCIGA.[13] This contingent interest in judicial efficiency cannot justify an exercise of personal jurisdiction in light of Olivier's insufficient showing on the other requirements of due process in the realm of personal jurisdiction.

For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.

FOOTNOTES

JOHN W. PECK, Senior, Senior Circuit Judge:

* *See* Rule 34-2(b), Rules of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

** Honorable John W. Peck, Senior U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

2 Property and liability guaranty funds, such as AIGA, LIGA and SCIGA, have been established by law in each of the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the U. S. Virgin Islands. Most of these laws are based on the "Post-Assessment Property and Liability Insurance Guaranty Association Model Act" adopted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners in December, 1969. *See generally Referenced Handbook on Insurance Company Insolvency*. 459 *et seq*. (Richard J. Marcus, ed., 2d ed. 1989).

3 The text of this section after amendments in 1987 does not differ materially from the text as it existed at the time of Olivier's accident and the date of insolvency of Midland Insurance. The current text reads as follows:

> "Covered claim" means an unpaid claim, including one for unearned premiums by or against the insured or agent, which arises out of and is within the coverage and not in excess of the applicable limits of an insurance

policy to which this Part applies issued by an insurer, if such insurer becomes an insolvent insurer after September 1, 1970, and; (i) The claimant or insured is a resident of this state at the time of the insured event; or (ii) The property from which the claim arises is permanently located in this state.

4 For the sake of brevity, where the South Carolina statutes governing SCIGA do not contain any important differences from the Louisiana statutes governing LIGA, we have omitted from this opinion the texts of the South Carolina statutes.

5 The relevant portions of these sections read as follows:

A. The association shall:

(1)(a) Be obliged to the extent of the covered claims . . . .

(2) Be deemed the insurer to the extent of its obligation on the covered claims and to such extent shall have all rights, duties and obligations of the insolvent insurer as if the insurer had not become insolvent.

6 S.C.Code Ann. § 38-31-60(b) corresponds to LA.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 22:1382 A(2). The first sentence of the paragraph in the South Carolina Code is virtually identical to its Louisiana counterpart. The South Carolina Legislature, however,

added the following to paragraph (b) of § 38-31-60:

However, the Association has the right but not the obligation to defend an insured who is not a resident of this State at the time of the insured event unless the property from which the claim arises is permanently located in this State in which instance the Association does have the obligation to defend the insured.

JOHNSON, Senior Circuit Judge:

1 Indeed, this portion of the majority's reasoning smacks of the "stream of commerce" theory of minimum contacts that was rejected by a plurality of the Supreme Court in *Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court*, 480 U.S. 102, 108-13, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1030-33, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987).

2 In its discussion of fair play and substantial justice, the majority evidently refers to those contacts again when it asserts that LIGA and SCIGA engaged in "economic activity" in Alabama which had "effects" in Alabama. *See ante* slip opinion at 1500. LIGA and SCIGA engaged in no economic activity of any sort in Alabama. Further, the only effect that actions by LIGA and SCIGA may have had in Alabama is their own liability for the judgment obtained against Merritt in Alabama, and that is not an "effect" relevant to personal jurisdiction. The majority does not, and cannot, point to any sort of reliance induced or any other kind of effect in Alabama. LIGA and SCIGA

simply have had no meaningful impact on Alabama.

3 In the remaining case, *Keelean*, there was no finding regarding the defendants' collective motive behind providing the guaranty even though such a motive may legitimately be attributed to every private guarantor. Instead, the Alabama Supreme Court rested its holding, that the exercise of personal jurisdiction did not violate due process, on a flawed interpretation of *Calder v. Jones*, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984). The *Keelean* court held that *Calder* established an "effects test" under which the exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper where the defendants should have foreseen the possible effect in the forum state in the event of a default on the guaranteed note. 544 So.2d at 157. However, the so-called 'effects test' described in *Calder* is much narrower and is applicable to neither *Keelean* nor the case at bar. The *Calder* court held that where defendants allegedly commit the *intentional* tort of libel, "expressly aimed at" a plaintiff in the forum state, *knowing* that the libelous material will have its greatest distribution in the forum state, the exercise of personal jurisdiction is justified. 465 U.S. at 789-90, 104 S.Ct. at 1486-88. Thus, the *Keelean* case is inapposite.

4 La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 22-1380(A) (West Supp. 1991); S.C.Code Ann. § 38-31-40 (Law.Coop.1990).

5 La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 22:1376 (West 1978); *see* S.C.Code Ann. §§ 38-31-60(b), 60(b) (Law.Co-op.1990).

6 La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 22:1380(A) (West Supp. 1991); S.C.Code Ann. § 38-31-40 (Law.Co-op.1990).

7 La.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 22:1379(b)(6), 1382(A)(3)(a)(i) (West Supp.1991); S.C.Code Ann. § 38-31-20(9), 38-31-60(c)(iii) (Law Co-op.1990).

8 La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 22:1382(A)(3)(a)(i) (West Supp.1991); S.C.Code Ann. § 38-31-60(c)(iii) (Law.Coop.1990).

9 The Louisiana and South Carolina provisions are identical.

10 Note that the majority erroneously considered this factor under the rubric of minimum contacts rather than reasonableness.

11 The priority provisions dictate that Olivier should seek coverage first from SCIGA because the insured, Merritt, was a South Carolina resident. *See* La.Stat.Ann. § 22:1386(B) (West Supp.1991); S.C.Code Ann § 38-31-100(2) (Law.Coop.1990).

12 *Cf. Burger King*, 471 U.S. at 483 n. 26, 105 S.Ct. at 2188 n. 26 (any conflict between state social policies should be resolved by choice of law principles; such conflict will not render an exercise of personal jurisdiction unreasonable).

13 *See supra* note 11.

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHERMAN J. OLIVIER,	*	
	*	
Plaintiff,	*	
	*	CIVIL ACTION
NUMBER:		
v.	*	
	*	84-0890-B
MERRITT DREDGING CO., INC.,	*	
	*	
	*	
Defendant.	*	

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiff's motion to reconsider this Court's order dismissing garnishees Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (LIGA) and South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (SCGA). Upon reconsideration, it is hereby ORDERED that the Court's order of April 30, 1990, be and hereby is hereby VACATED and this order be SUBSTITUTED in its place.

Background

On July 21, 1989, writs of garnishment were

issued against LIGA and SCGA pursuant to affidavits filed by counsel for plaintiff Sherman J. Olivier (Olivier) alleging that the garnishees were believed to be indebted to defendant Merritt Dredging Company, Inc. (Merritt) or to have effects of Merritt in its possession or control.

This garnishment action arises from a personal injury suit filed by Olivier, against his former employer, Merritt, for injuries which he incurred on board a Merritt vessel during dredging operations on the Alabama River. Olivier, a resident of Louisiana was a seaman on the vessel at the time of his injury. On December 7, 1988, a jury returned a verdict in this case in favor of the plaintiff. On February 14, 1989, the Court entered final judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $522,190.00.

After the commencement of this action, but prior to trial, both Merritt and its insurer,

Midland Insurance Company (Midland), were placed in bankruptcy. At trial Merritt was represented by its excess insurer which has subsequently settled from this action. According to the plaintiff, an outstanding judgment amount of $469,645.95 remains. Consequently, the plaintiff has filed garnishments against both LIGA and SCGA under the theory that a portion of Midland's premiums were paid to them to protect claimants from the insurance company's insolvency. According to the plaintiff, both LIGA and SCGA are liable to Olivier as a claimant to insurance proceeds owed by Midland on behalf of Merritt as a result of the judgment in this action. Both LIGA and SCGA have filed motions to dismiss on the ground that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

The burden of establishing jurisdiction is upon the party seeking to invoke the federal court's jurisdiction. Product Promotions, Inc.

v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974). In most instances, determining whether the court has in personam jurisdiction requires a two-part analysis. First, the court must determine whether the defendant's actions meet the requirements of the forum state's long-arm statute. If not, the Court has no jurisdiction because service of process cannot be achieved and the inquiry ends. If the defendant's actions do satisfy the statutory requirements, then the court must consider whether the statute goes beyond the permissible limits of state jurisdiction over nonresident defendants set forth in International Shoe Co v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and its progeny. Prejean at 1264.

Alabama courts have abandoned this two-step analysis through their interpretation of the state's long-arm statute. Hales v. First Appalachian Corporation, 494 F.Supp. 330 (N.D.Ala. 1980). The Alabama Supreme Court has

held that service of process and, therefore, personal jurisdiction, is "as broad as the permissible limits of due process. Alabama Weatherproofing Co., Inc. v. Hanby, 431 So.2d 141 (Ala. 1983). Thus, under Alabama law the court must engage only in a single-step analysis to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists; that is, "whether the assertion of jurisdiction meets federal due process standards." MacKinnon v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway, 518 So.2d 89, 91 (Ala. 1987).

In International Shoe, the Supreme Court held that it would be a violation of due process to bring a person into a forum with which he has established no meaningful ties. In that case the Court set forth the guiding principle of analysis in personal jurisdiction cases. The Court held that in order for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, that person must have "minimum contacts" with the forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction

over him "does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 316.

The plaintiff contends that the contacts the Court should consider in this case are those between the insurer, Midland Insurance, and the forum. According to Olivier, personal jurisdiction over Midland Insurance is equivalent to personal jurisdiction over LIGA and SCGA because guaranty associations "stand in the shoes" of their insolvent insurers. The plaintiff cites several cases to support his contention that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Midland Insurance. Personal jurisdiction over Midland, however, is not in issue. The issue is whether LIGA and SCGA have sufficient minimum contacts with this jurisdiction.

One factor in determining the type of contacts which meet the International Shoe requirements is foreseeability. The defendant's conduct or connection with the forum must be

such that he could "reasonably foresee being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). The Court does not find it reasonably foreseeable that a state-

created agency such as LIGA or SCGA would be subject to suit in a foreign jurisdiction absent specific statutory authority. Plaintiff suggests that it is reasonably foreseeable that a claim against an insolvent insurer may arise in another state. That, however, is not the type of foreseeability dictated by World-Wide Volkswagen. The question is whether the garnishees in this matter could reasonably foresee being haled into court in this jurisdiction.

In light of the purpose and function of state guaranty associations, it would be illogical to assume that the creators of LIGA and SCGA contemplated that those agencies would be subject to jurisdiction in foreign forums.

In Rhulen Agency, Inc. v. Alabama Insurance Guaranty Association, 715 F.Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd on other grounds, 896 F.2d 674 (2nd Cir. 1990) the plaintiff filed suit against twenty-six state insurance guaranty associations such as LIGA and SCGA. The court, holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over out-of-state insurance guaranty associations, noted:

> The defendants [guaranty associations of various states] for the most part exist under statutory provisions derived from the "Post Assessment Property and Liability Insurance Guaranty Association Model Act," adopted by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. The various states have established different statutory versions of this Model Act. While the applicable statutes may vary considerably, both in format and the local construction attributed to the specific words, the essential premise upon which all defendants operate is for our purposes identical. They provide statutory benefits to those holders of policies issued within the state by insurers which thereafter failed.

Id. at 96, 97.

Both LIGA and SCGA cover only claims against an insolvent insurer if the insurer is authorized to transact business in the state and the claimant or insured is a resident of the state or the property that is the subject of the claim is permanently located in the state. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:1379 (West 1978); S.C. Code Ann. § 38-31-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Furthermore, these guaranty associations are funded by insurance companies as a condition of their authority to transact business within the state. La.Rev.Stat.Ann § 22:1382 (West 1978); S.C. Code Ann. § 38-31-40 (Law. Co-Op. 1976).

Another minimum contacts requirement is that the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of conducting activities within in the forum or purposely direct his activities at the forum. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 474 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).

The garnishees in this action cannot be said to have purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business in this state, nor can they be said to have purposely directed activities at the forum.

This is especially true in light of the fact that LIGA and SCGA are statutorily-created entities. Their duty, if any, to the plaintiff arises only from state law. As the court in Rhulen noted:

> The guaranty associations have no privity of contract with [the plaintiff] or with the named insureds. Their duty is statutory only... Nothing in the Model Act or in any of the local state acts has been brought to our attention which would evidence any intent of these guaranty associations or the respective legislatures which created them to subject their operations to the long-arm jurisdiction of some other state.

Id. at 96, 97.

Based on the plaintiff's failure to establish proof that the garnishees have sufficient minimum contacts with this forum to

satisfy the due process requirements of International Shoe and its progeny, the Court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the movants. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the motions to dismiss garnishment filed by the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association and by the South Carolina Guaranty Association be and hereby are GRANTED.

DONE this the 19th day of December, 1990.

(signed) Charles R. Butler, Jr.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

(Date stamped: DEC 21 1990)

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE IV, SECTION. 1.

Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENT X.

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENT XIV, SECTION. 1.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

APPENDIX F

ALABAMA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

RULE 4.2 PROCESS: BASIS FOR AND METHODS OF OUT-OF-STATE SERVICE

(a) Basis for Out-of-State Service.

(1) ***When Proper.*** Appropriate basis exists for service of process outside of this state upon a person in any action in this state when

(A) the person is, at the time of the service of process, either a nonresident of this state or a resident of this state who is absent from the state, and

(B) the person has sufficient contacts with this state, as set forth in subdivision (a)(2) of this rule, so that the prosecution of the action against the person in this state is not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States, or, the person is sued in his capacity as executor, administrator, or other personal representative of an estate for the acts or omissions of his decedent or ward, and the person so sued does not otherwise have sufficient contacts with this state in his capacity as personal representative, but the person's decedent or ward would have been deemed to have sufficient contacts with this state if the action could have been maintained against him.

(2) *Sufficient Contacts.* A person has sufficient contacts with the state when that person, acting directly or by agent, is or may be legally responsible as a consequence of that person's

(A) transacting any business in this state;

(B) contracting to supply services or goods in this state;

(C) causing tortious injury or damage by an act or omission in this state including but not limited to actions arising out of the ownership, operation or use of a motor vehicle, aircraft, boat or watercraft in this state;

(D) causing tortious injury or damage in this state by an act or omission outside this state if the person regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state;

(E) causing injury or damage in this state to any person by breach of warranty expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this state when the person might reasonably have expected such other person to use, consume, or be affected by the goods in this state, provided that the person also regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state;

(F) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state;

(G) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting;

(H) living in the marital relationship within this state notwithstanding subsequent departure from this state, as to all obligations arising from alimony, custody, child support, or property settlement, if the other party to the marital relationship continues to reside in this state; or

(I) otherwise having some minimum contacts with this state and, under the circumstances, it is fair and reasonable to require the person to come to this state to defend an action. The minimum contacts referred to in this subdivision (I) shall be deemed sufficient, notwithstanding a failure to satisfy the requirement of subdivisions (A)-(H) of this subsection (2), so long as the prosecution of the action against a person in this state is not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States.

(3) *"Person" Defined.* This term "person" as used herein includes an individual, his executor, administrator, or other personal representative, or a corporation, partnership, association or any other legal or commercial entity.

APPENDIX G

ALABAMA CODE

§ 6-6-390. When process of garnishment obtainable.

The plaintiff in any pending action for the recovery of money or the plaintiff or assignee in any judgment on which execution can issue may obtain process of garnishment as defined in section 6-6-370; provided, that no garnishment shall issue prior to a final judgment, pursuant to this section and sections 6-6-291 through 6-6-294, unless there is a showing that such garnishment is necessary because of extraordinary circumstances. (Code 1852, § 2471; Code 1867, § 2892; Code 1876, §§ 3218, 3219; Code 1886, §§ 2968, 2971; Code 1896, § 2172; Code 1907, § 4301; Code 1923, § 8052; Code 1940, T. 7, § 996; Acts 1951, No. 916, p. 1568.)

APPENDIX H

SOUTH CAROLINA CODE ANNOTATED

§38-31-20. Definitions.

. . .

(3) "Covered claim" means an unpaid claim, including one of unearned premiums, which arises out of and is within the coverage and not in excess of the applicable limits of an insurance policy to which this chapter applies issued by an insurer, if the insured is an insolvent insurer and (a) the claimant or insured is a resident of this State at the time of the insured event, or (b) the property from which the claim arises is permanently located in this State. It does not include any amount due any reinsurer, insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association, any subrogation recoveries or otherwise.

APPENDIX I

§38-31-30. Application of chapter.

This chapter applies to all kinds of direct insurance except life, title, surety, accident and health, credit, mortgage guaranty, and ocean marine insurance.

APPENDIX J

§38-31-40. Association created; membership as condition of authority to transact insurance; accounts.

There is created a nonprofit unincorporated legal entity to be known as the South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association. All insurers defined as member insurers in item (5) of §38-31-20 are members of the Association as a condition of their authority to transact insurance in this State. The Association shall perform its functions under a plan of operation established and approved under §38-31-70 and shall exercise its powers through a board of directors established under §38-31-50. For purposes of administration and assessment, the Association is divided into three separate accounts:

(a) the workers' compensation insurance account;

(b) the automobile insurance account; and

(c) the account for all other insurance to which this chapter applies.

APPENDIX K

§38-31-60. Powers and duties of Association.

The Association:

(a) Is obligated to the extent of claims existing prior to the determination of insolvency and claims arising up to the earliest of the following dates:

(i) thirty days after the determination of insolvency;

(ii) the policy expiration date; or

(iii) the date the insured replaces or cancels the policy.

This obligation includes only the amount each covered claim is in excess of one hundred dollars and is less than three hundred thousand dollars. However the Association shall pay the full amount of any covered workers' compensation claim. In no event is the Association obligated to a policyholder or claimant in an amount in excess of the obligation of the insolvent insurer under the policy from which the claim arises.

APPENDIX L

(b) Is considered the insurer to the extent of its obligation on the covered claims and, to this extent, has all rights, duties, and obligations of the insolvent insurer as if the insurer had not become insolvent.

APPENDIX M

(c) Shall allocate claims paid and expenses incurred among the three accounts separately and assess member insurers separately for each account amounts necessary to pay:

(i) the obligation of the Association under item (a) of this section;

(ii) the expenses of handling covered claims;

(iii) the cost of examinations under § 38-31-110; and

(iv) other expenses authorized by this chapter.

The assessments of each member insurer must be in the proportion that the net direct written premiums of the member insurer for the calendar year preceding the insolvency on the kinds of insurance in the account bear to the net direct written premiums of all member insurers for the calendar year preceding the insolvency on the kinds of insurance in the account. Each member insurer must be notified of the assessment not later than thirty days before it is due. No member insurer may be assessed in any year on any account an amount greater than one percent of that member insurer's net direct written premiums for the calendar year preceding the insolvency on the kinds of insurance in the account. If the maximum assessment, together with the other assets of the Association in any account, does not provide in any year an amount sufficient to

make all necessary payments from that account, the funds available must be prorated and the unpaid portion must be paid as soon thereafter as funds become available. The Association may exempt or defer, in whole or in part, the assessment of any member insurer, if the assessment would cause the member insurer's financial statement to reflect amounts of capital or surplus less than the minimum amounts required for a certificate of authority by any jurisdiction in which the member insurer is authorized to transact insurance. Any member insurer serving in the capacity of a servicing carrier for the South Carolina Reinsurance Facility, the South Carolina Windstorm and Hail Underwriting Association, the Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association, or any other involuntary association may not be assessed for the premiums so written, but the assessment must be made directly against the facility, pool, joint underwriting association, or other association. Each member insurer serving as a servicing facility on behalf of the Association may set off against any assessment authorized payments made on covered claims and expenses incurred in the payment of such claims by the member insurer.

APPENDIX N

§38-31-100. Claimants required to exhaust rights under other policies; claims recoverable from more than one association.

. . .

(2) Any person having a claim which may be recovered under more than one insurance guaranty association or its equivalent shall seek recovery first from the association of the place of residence of the insured except that, if it is a first-party claim for damage to property with a permanent location, he shall seek recovery first from the association of the location of the property, and, if it is a workers' compensation claim, he shall seek recovery first from the association of the residence of the claimant. Any recovery under this chapter must be reduced by the amount of recovery from any other insurance guaranty association or its equivalent.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing has been served upon counsel for all parties to this proceeding by mailing three copies of the same by United States Mail, first class postage prepaid, on this the 4th day of June, 1992 as follows:

Patrick Sims, Esq.
Cabaniss, Johnstone, Gardner,
Dumas & O'Neal
Post Office Box 2906
Mobile, Alabama 36652
(205) 433-6961

G. Hamp Uzzelle, III, Esq.
Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves,
& Johnston
P. O. Box 123
Mobile, Alabama 36601
(205) 432-5511